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iology and computing might not seem the most comfort-
able of bedfellows. It is easy to imagine nature and technol-
ogy clashing as the green-welly brigade rub up awkwardly
against the back-room bofﬁns. But collaboration between the two
ﬁelds has exploded in recent years, driven primarily by massive
investment in the emerging ﬁeld of bioinformatics charged with
mapping the human genome. New algorithms and computational
infrastructures have enabled research groups to collaborate effect-
ively on a worldwide scale in building huge, exponentially grow-
ing genomic databases, to ‘mine’ these mountains of data for
useful information, and to construct and manipulate innovative
computational models of the genes and proteins that have been
identiﬁed. This recent burst of high-proﬁle activity might suggest
that computer scientists have only recently begun to work on
biological questions, but activity at this particular disciplinary
interface is by no means new. In fact, it has an extremely long
history involving the most famous early pioneers of computing,
cybernetics, and artiﬁcial intelligence.
In the 1950s, Alan Turing, the ‘father of artiﬁcial intelligence’
and a man fundamentally associated with codes, logic, chess,
and other mechanico-mathematical arcana, developed inﬂuential
models of biological morphogenesis:
1 the processes involved in the
development of biological patterns as an organism grows from a
single cell. He was particularly interested in accounting for the
tendency of spiral patterns in many plant structures to obey the
Fibonacci sequence (e.g. if you count the number of whirls running
clockwise on a pine cone and the number running anticlockwise,the two numbers will be consecutive terms in Fibonacci’s famous
sequence of integers: 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, . . .). At the same time,
John von Neumann, one of history’s great polymaths and the man
responsible for game theory and the architecture of the modern
computer among many other things typically considered to lie far
from the muddy ﬁeld of biology, worked on the problem of self-
replication:
2 over evolutionary time, simple life-forms have given
rise to more complicated creatures, but how, von Neumann asked,
could a machine (like a dog or an amoeba or a robot) make a more
complex version of itself? The answer that he arrived at predicted
the essential distinction between DNA (instructions) and tran-
scriptase (machinery that follows instructions) several years before
Crick and Watson’s discovery.
Surprisingly, though, the very ﬁrst example of activity fusing
computing and biology is over a century older than the work of
Turing and von Neumann, predating even Darwin’s Origin of
Species. It is due to Charles Babbage, designer of the Difference
Engine, the ﬁrst automatic calculating machine and the progenitor
of the modern computer. As early as 1837, Babbage reported using
this machine to help him demonstrate that inexplicably abrupt
changes in the geological record need not be taken to be the work
of God (a hot topic of the day). He showed that his completely
deterministic (clockwork) machine could generate analogous sur-
prising behaviour (‘miracles’) without any external interference
from the programmer. He invited his contemporaries (including
Darwin) to observe the machine generating a sequence of num-
bers (1, 2, 3, 4, . . .) and asked them to state the rule or law that the
machine was obeying. At some predetermined point the engine
would  ‘disobey’ this law, automatically beginning to generate
some alternative stream of numbers (the Fibonacci sequence,
perhaps), and surprising the onlookers, who were forced to
admit that apparently mysterious and abrupt changes observed in
nature need not demand explanation in terms of divine
intervention.
3
It is clear, then, that computing and biology have communicated
from almost the ﬁrst possible moment, and have been ﬁnding new
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this tradition that some of Richard Dawkins’ most interesting
work can be located. Indeed, there are two senses in which this is
true. First, and most straightforwardly, Dawkins has had a signiﬁ-
cant involvement in the development of bio-inspired algorithms,
speciﬁcally within the ﬁeld of evolutionary computation, where
computer programs solve problems in a manner inspired by bio-
logical evolution. In 1986, in The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins
introduced an algorithm of the same name. This computer pro-
gram requires a user repeatedly to select one of nine bilaterally
symmetrical line drawings, or ‘biomorphs’ (see Fig. 1). After each
selection, nine new variants of the chosen biomorph are randomly
generated and presented. Over time, the line drawings ‘evolve’ to
reﬂect the taste of the user, who is effectively breeding biomorphs
by exerting selection pressure on a population of forms that are
competing with one another for the chance to ‘reproduce’.
A year later, Dawkins presented his biomorphs at an ‘Inter-
disciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living
1. Biomorphs ‘evolved’ using the Blind Watchmaker program.
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The meeting brought together a disparate group of researchers
from computing, mathematics, physics, biology, neuroscience,
and even economics to talk about a set of topics that have come
to be known collectively as Artiﬁcial Life.
4 What is life? Can it
be synthesized in silico? What can we learn about life in the
attempt? Dawkins’ involvement at the outset of artiﬁcial life
(along with that of other biologists such as Elliot Sober and John
Maynard Smith) leant the ﬁeld some credibility, but his contribu-
tions
5 to the ﬁrst conference is also notable in its own right. In it,
he presented the Blind Watchmaker program as a tool with which
to explore the notion of evolvability—the tendency of a popula-
tion to tolerate and eventually proﬁt from small changes (muta-
tions). This property remains poorly understood. While biological
progeny are not identical to their parents or their siblings, they
typically remain viable organisms. By contrast, introducing a few
random mutations into a computer program or a hospital’s work-
ing procedures is likely to prove catastrophic. Moreover, the muta-
tions suffered by biological organisms are not just neutralized,
corrected, or ironed out, since enough useful variation amongst
relatives remains to fuel natural selection. This balance between
robustness and sensitivity, between staying the same and
changing, has yet to be understood and exploited in evolutionary
computation or other relevant ﬁelds—amongst other things, a full
understanding of it would revolutionize our ability to manage
evolving complex systems such as hospitals, cities, economies, and
so on. Dawkins’ paper represents an early attempt to address
some of these issues.
Dawkins’ program itself is unusual in that, unlike standard
evolutionary algorithms, it demands that the user manually exert
selection pressure on an artiﬁcial evolving population, choosing
which ‘biomorphs’ get to reproduce. This approach has inspired a
whole oeuvre of ‘aesthetic evolutionary algorithms’ in which art-
ists produce their art in partnership with an artiﬁcial evolutionary
process, moving far beyond Dawkins’ stick ﬁgures, to generate
much more complex pieces
6 (see Figs. 2 and 3). Our commonsense
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(actually making, altering, improving the artefact) with a selective
aspect (choosing whether the alteration makes the artefact better,
or complete). By contrast, Dawkins’ evolutionary approach cedes
responsibility for generation to the computer which randomly
(rather than purposively) perturbs the currently selected indi-
vidual. The artist reserves only the right to sift these perturbed
forms and select which of them are to be (mis)copied into the next
generation.
As such, in addition to serving as a tool with which to introduce
adaptation by natural selection to a general audience, the program
raises a number of interesting questions concerning progress,
purpose, and creativity in art and nature. Is the user of such a
computer program really an artist, and if so what is the status
of the program’s writer? Can pointing and clicking one’s way
through a (potentially inﬁnite) genetic space of ‘predeﬁned’ forms
be somehow equivalent to painting or drawing? In fact, the prac-
tice resembles the (non-artistic?) selective breeding of plants,
livestock, or domestic animals, but simultaneously resonates
with some experimental art in which the artist’s volition is simi-
larly attenuated (e.g. Jackson Pollock’s action painting, which
coupled spontaneous ‘random’ splashing and dripping with careful
subsequent editing, cropping, or outright rejection).
7
While Dawkins’ simple computer program was the ﬁrst example
of a commercially released piece of artiﬁcial life software, its
potency is better evidenced by the number of times it has been
recoded and extended by those who have read about it. The inter-
net is home to a veritable cottage industry of biomorph breeding,
and many programmers (including my teenage self) must have
written their variants of the Blind Watchmaker before the internet
allowed them to be widely disseminated. There is something com-
pelling in the combination of simplicity, scope, and visual impact
that captures the imagination of these programmers, and comes
to inﬂuence the way that they think about evolutionary processes
and algorithms. This is the second sense in which Dawkins’
work lies at the boundary between computing and biology—the
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and talking to understand and explain evolutionary biological
processes: what might be termed algorithmic biology.
8
An algorithm is a set of step-by-step instructions, like a cake
recipe or travel directions. As such, our tacit understanding is that
they are useful, but inert and straightforward. Dawkins employs
an algorithmic device explicitly when he describes, in The Blind
Watchmaker, how a particular string of symbols (the sentence:
‘Methinks it is like a weasel’) might arise via reproduction, muta-
tion, and selection in a population of initially random symbol
strings.
9 By repeatedly applying the same sequence of actions, the
appearance of deliberate design is achieved despite the randomness
inherent to the process and the vast number of possible sentences
(roughly 27
28 if we don’t care about upper case or punctuation).
Like his biomorphs program, this algorithm is a powerful rhet-
orical device because it mechanizes and thereby demystiﬁes natural
selection (at the expense, perhaps, of muddying the waters con-
cerning the nature of biological selection pressures, which are
neither aesthetic nor aiming at a prearranged target).
There are, of course, alternative ways of conveying the central
tenets of natural selection: drawing parallels with selective breed-
ing of pigeons or ﬂowers; conveying the impact of ﬁnite resources
on heritable variation; explaining the implications of the second
law of thermodynamics for copying processes. Dawkins makes
use of many of these, but algorithmic devices are special. One of
their key features is that they are multiply realizable. This just
means that the same algorithm can be carried out by many differ-
ent machines. You or I could follow the same set of directions and
your computer or mine could execute the Blind Watchmaker pro-
gram (if the languages in which the algorithms are written are
appropriate). Algorithms abstract away from nitty-gritty imple-
mentation details (just where is my cake tin? how exactly do I
‘jump on the No. 1 bus’?), casting a process at a level that rises
somewhat above particular instances of execution, without resort-
ing to mathematical or logical formalisms that have limited
currency.
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selection, rather than writing in terms of, for example, competi-
tion for scarce resources (ﬁghting, ﬂeeing, feeding, sex), the evo-
lutionary process is free to dissociate from the ‘four Fs’, thereby
becoming readily applicable to a wider range of non-genetic
(quasi-)evolutionary systems. Most famously, and much earlier,
in The Selﬁsh Gene Dawkins was able to reapply the abstracted
principles of natural selection within the realm of ideas, conjuring
the  meme as an ideational equivalent of the biological gene.
10
Since then, there has been a signiﬁcant proliferation of (quasi-)
evolutionary approaches to a range of non-genetic systems: evo-
lutionary linguistics, economics, psychology, and even cosmology,
as well as evolutionary computation and art. In most cases, the
success or failure of these enterprises cannot yet be judged, but
their very existence is testament to the expanding power of
uprooted evolutionary biological concepts and, in particular, the
biological algorithm at the heart of evolution by natural selection.
The pioneers name-checked at the outset of this paper suggest
that, historically, most signiﬁcant workers at the computing–
biology interface have tended to be mathematicians or computer
scientists who are interested in biological questions. Dawkins
bucks this trend somewhat, in that he is a biologist, and one who
has not been particularly interested in computational questions.
Rather, he is interested in using computers, not just as tools with
which to write or calculate, but primarily as tools with which to
think.
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